Source: Employment and labour markets: Key tables from OECD (2010) [Last updated: 3.1.2011] . http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/average-annual-working-time- 2010_20752342-2010 2010_20752342- -table8 (last visited: 15. July. 2011 In terms of hours worked per week, the OECD statistics reveal again that workers from Southern European countries are by no means less labour-loving than the German ones. In 2009, workers from Germany worked 35.7 hours per week, while those from Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy 42.5, 38.8, 38.9 and 38.0, respectively. 8 In regard to holidays, the statistical data of Eurofund for the year 2009 reveals that the annual leave entitlement "varies from 30 days in Denmark and Germany to 23 days in Greece […] , while the entitlement is 24 days in Malta, 22 in Portugal and Spain." 9 Clearly, the data do not confirm the working hypothesis with respect to the work-averse attitude of Southern European people. On the contrary, they confirm the analysis of Rodrigez- The OECD data clearly shows that the South does by no means exit the labour market earlier.
C. Result: The Mythos of the Lazy South
To summarize, it appears that the profile of the lazy, holiday-addicted and early pensioned Southern Europeans as presented in the media has little to do with reality (See also Faigle, 10 Rodrigez-Pose/Tselios (2011), 2. 11 For Germany, the figure is about to rise steadily to 67 years. , Beller, 19.5.2011 , Kaufmann, 2011 . Portuguese workers leave the labour market later than the rest of European workers; their annual leave entitlement together with that of the Spanish workers is the shortest and the Greeks appear to work the most. Bild's assertion vis-a-vis Greece that "Germany does have large debts -but we can also pay them. It is because we wake up pretty early in the morning and we work the whole day" 12 proves to be empty. But let us restate the aforementioned assertion in another way. Could Greeks work more or longer in order to stop the crisis? Or, to put it differently, what are the effects of the financial crisis on the Greek employment?
III. Why They do not Work More or Even Longer?
Paul Krugman's prediction that Greece was going to face a painful period with high unemployment rates accompanied by economic recession came, not unexpectedly, true (Krugman, 2010) . The overall unemployment rate has risen sharply from 9.5% in 2009 to 12.5% in 2010 (Matsaganis/Leventi, 2011, 4) . And this was only the beginning. According to the Hellenic Statistical Service, the jobless rate rose to 15.9 percent in the first quarter of In addition, an unknown number of small businesses have closed as a result of the economic recession, while some larger businesses relocated to other Balkan countries where taxes and labour costs are lower (Matsaganis/Leventi, 2011, 4 ; see also Guardian, Editorial, 23.6.2011) .
Peter Prontzos, a political science professor at Langara College in British Columbia, characterized the harsh measures taken as a sort of collective punishment imposed on farmers, workers and small business owners for a crisis that they did not create (Prontzos, June 2011) .
A comment of Costas Douzinas, Professor at Birckbeck, University of London, and Petros Papaconstantinou, columnist, was published in the Guardian on June 27, 2011. This very comment had recourse to a more categorical language when criticizing the unsustainability of the austerity measures as well as the role of the media in creating the image of the "lazy"
Greek. In particular, the introductory paragraph reads as follows:
"After months of attacks on the supposedly feckless Greeks, the western media, intellectuals such Amartya Sen and Jürgen Habermas and the United Nations have finally woken up to the fact that the catastrophic austerity imposed on Greece is unsustainable. It was about time. This is an unprecedented and morally odious type of collective punishment imposed on a majority of This highlights perhaps the biggest problem of unaccountable, rightwing, supranational institutions."
"This [the deployment of an economic stimulus] is going to happen even under the European authorities, but first, they are putting the country through years of unnecessary suffering. And they are taking advantage of the situation to privatise public assets at fire sale prices and restructure the Greek state and economy, so that it is more to their liking."
[…]
"The IMF's latest review of its agreement with Greece suggests that the Euro, for the Greek economy, is still 20-34% overvalued. This makes a recovery through "internal devaluation" -that is, keeping unemployment extremely high and therefore lowering wages to make the economy more internationally competitive -an even more remote possibility than it would otherwise be."
Once we have disproved the claim concerning the inclination of Southern Europe, especially that of the Greeks, towards laziness, we can also come to the conclusion that Greeks do not even have the choice to work more, to become more productive, in order to fight the crisis. In fact, it is quite the opposite. The measures lead to unemployment. The "laziness" does not make crises; rather the crises destroy jobs (Kaufmann, 2011, 5) .
IV. Political Reactions against the Myths
Of course, there have been reactions to the characterizations already presented. What is the function of such myth-making and demonizing?
V. Effects of the Myths: Divide and Rule Revised
One way to understand the "laziness-statements" is to argue that they encapsulate the demand for further reforms and changes by southern European countries. While the measures taken have already had catastrophic consequences for the middle and low class income families in
Greece, it appears that these sort of statements set the groundwork for further and harsher measures. "He who gives the money, defines the course" has been pointed out vividly in this context (Faigle, 19.5.2011) . In fact, it is no coincidence that almost at the same time the IMF sent a warning to Athens expressing the need for higher saving efforts in order to be on track to save the economy (Bild, 19.5.2011 ). Sovereignty -a legal or rather political term for international lawyers of the old generation. In reality, it is a mere economic one.
At the same time, there is another more political strategic perspective associated with these defamations provided by German media and politicians. By creating popular negative-images and by drawing the attention of the German citizens to the South, German citizens get distracted from problems within their own country, e.g. Germany. In addition, one could also identify a hidden disciplinary function of those messages. The order could sound like this:
"Work! Look what happened to the lazy Southern Europeans. In contrast to their leaders, we are working for your own good, so keep' on working." Viewed from this perspective, labour, public sector employees, etc. get subtly reinstructed and disciplined.
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By creating negative images about a country or a population, you can, under particular circumstances, punish the relevant country in question. It goes without saying, for instance, that the last citadel and hope of the Greek economy is the tourism sector. To use the words of Paul Krugman, the country offers among others "a spectacular archipelago, in a wonderful climate" (Krugman, 8.7.2011) . However, as the following excerpt from the New York Times shows, the promotion of antithetic attitudes by the media influences the relationship among peoples and, consequently, can have additional negative effects on the Greek economy:
"Jenny Wiblishauser, 33, a single mother in the southern town of Memmingen, said Germany's financial prudence -and its willingness to ignore foreign criticism -made her proud. "Before, the Greeks would call us Nazis, and we would act vulnerable," she said. "Now one says, 'Well, I'm not driving there for vacation'" (Kulish, 13.8.2010 ).
Apart from that, another interesting aspect here is the new dimension of such a punishment.
As a rule, upon recommendation or even based on a decision of an international body, a government adopts the respective measures. In legal terms, you need a national act executing the international one. And even in the case that such acts do not need any further national implementation, e.g. they enjoy a direct effect just as the "supranational" EC regulations, there is always the vertical dimension that comes into play. This means that the measures are imposed from an authority from above. The aforementioned claims of "collective punishment" 17 are, indeed, based on this very vertical-dimensioned scheme. On the other hand, as the passage cited above indicates, if private decisions of people are intended to punish other people, the punishment is transferred from the level of verticality to that of horizontality.
It should also be recalled that Southern Europe is often linked with romantic and idyllic moments and images. Now, the lazy-profile aims at de-romanticizing and de-idyllizing those countries by transforming them from southern countries into sinner countries. 18 One could recall Hardt/Negri's term of biopower in this context (Hardt/Negri, 2000, 23-24, 26-27) . By virtually demanding the imposition of a brand new disciplined life-culture and work attitude, one practically demands the hegemonic imposition of a new "correct" bios, e.g. the Greek term for life, to the "undisciplined" citizens of the South.
Moreover, one could indeed go as far as to claim that the images as promoted by the media in question pursue a form of cultural expropriation, since by spreading the sense of difference among nations/peoples you can nullify the probability of a cooperation and, in particular, of a common struggle. The dividing line here is not the class, but the different work-ethic or the different attitude towards leisure-time as presented by the media. To use the terminology of Hardt/Negri, capital expropriates the national resources of a country, thus featuring a neocolonial dimension (Hardt/Negri, 2009, 137-138) . In the case of Greece, the aforementioned neoliberal measures taken to "fight" the economic crisis simply confirm this. The most important aspect, however, is the next level of expropriation concerning the social relationships. As Hardt/Negri maintain, the latter aspect of expropriation is more dynamic, since it does not lend itself to a logic of scarcity as natural resources do. Its central element is the expropriation of cooperation (Hardt/Negri, 2009, 140-141) , and this appears to be what the images presented by the media intend to do. In line with the Hardt/Negri approach, one could, hence, conclude that such a dynamic expropriation leads to cultural isolation. Under the principle "divide and rule", biopower as instrumentalized by those controlling the media, aims at proving that there is nothing "common" left. This becomes even more tragic if we take into account the cooperation in the sense of interconnection with other common struggles, e.g. the so-called "circulation of the common" is deemed to be perhaps the most effective response to such an expropriation (de Peuter/Dyer-Witheford, 2010, 32 and esp. 47-48) . 18 In German one could play with the words saying: "von Südländern zu Sündeländern".
VI. Summary
Southern Europe and especially Greece have been demonized by the German media by way of creating the image of a lazy and work-averse free lancer as opposed to that of the workobsessive German citizen. A review of the OECD statistical database, however, shows that citizens of the countries in question, e.g. Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, do not work less, do not enjoy longer holidays and also do not effectively leave the labour market earlier than their German counterparts. In other words, the images as presented by the media and some political personalities do not reflect the reality. In short, the "laziness" does not make crises;
rather the crises destroy jobs. In fact, the effects of such malevolent images created by the media constitute the real demons which need to be dispelled. The effects of this stereotyping can be summarized as follows:
1. Alarm and prepare the citizens of Southern Europe for further austerity measures, since "he who gives the money, defines the course".
2. Exercise pressure on the governments of Southern Europe to intensify their reform programs.
3. Distract German citizens from problems within their own country.
4. Discipline and reinstruct the German workers and public sector employees to keep on working.
5. De-romanticize and de-idyllize Southern Europe by transforming southern countries into sinner countries.
6. Hegemonically impose a new bios, e.g. life, to the undisciplined South.
7. Expropriate the possibility of a common struggle by virtue of the principle "divide and rule", thus imposing a cultural isolation.
